Introduction
Since the pioneering work on marriage of Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1974 , marriage formation is often modeled as a matching process similar to labor market matching between workers and rms, where males and females meet each other randomly or are assisted by commercial agents (Weiss, 1997) . This approach ignores a unique feature of marriage matching: marriage is not simply two individuals forming a new family; rather, it directly aects the welfare of their parents. An example of parental welfare being aected is old age support. Throughout history and still so in many developing countries today, old age support depends critically on children (Cheung 1972 ; Davidson and Ekelund 1997; Anderson 2003) . How do parents ensure that old age support will be provided by children after they grow up? An interesting answer is provided by Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015) (BMS (2015) hereafter), who argue that when old age support is mainly provided by adult children, parents will put in resources to meddle with children's preferences (i.e., to make them more altruistic) to ensure their commitment to providing old age support.
In this paper we examine how considerations of old age support shape marriage outcomes when marriages are matched by parents. We argue that parental matchmaking involves a tradeo between children's welfare and parents' welfare. Parents that help matchmaking have a long-term relationship with the couple after the matching is done; such future interactions may distort incentives in the matching process and therefore aect matching outcomes.
In particular, consider a son that chooses between self and parental match. His satisfaction with his spouse depends on expected marriage outcomes, including the couple's joint income, household production (such as home-provided old age support and the number of children), and the love between him and his future wife. From the parents' perspectives, they obtain a spillover from the couple's income, enjoy direct household production including the care and services provided in house by the couple (and especially from the wife) when they are old (BMS, 2015) . Being altruistic, parents may also obtain an altruistic component originated from the son's welfare from the marriage.
Conict of interest arises from the parents' keen interest in the couple's joint income and household production including old age support. Parents who expect to receive nancial, emotional and old age support from their son after his marriage may care less about how attractive his wife is to him but more about how able she is in contributing to family income, wealth and/or old age support via household production (Cheung 1972) . Parents may also care more about the compatibility of the daughter-in-law's preference with their needs for old age support. In other words, parents weigh their harmony with the daughter-in-law more heavily than the harmony between the future couple. As a result, the best wife candidate in the eyes of parents likely diers from what is optimal to the son, even though parents are altruistic and care about the son's welfare. Thus, parent matchmaking carries an agency cost for the son, while it is at the same time a key instrument to ensure parental welfare as parents grow old.
Without search costs, the son would prefer self search to avoid the agency cost in parental matchmaking. However, parents and children dier in search costs. On one hand, parents may face higher search costs for love between the potential couple than the son. On the other hand, parents can have a wide access to potential candidates via their social networks. For instance, in places where parents are linked to a larger social network, search costs would be lower in parental matchmaking than in children's self search. Parental search can represent a greater advantage if parents are better at judging the candidate's character and earning ability. Thus, despite parental matching's agency cost, it sometimes could be optimal for the son to choose parental matchmaking because of the saving in search costs.
Other important reasons for parental matchmaking are culture, tradition and social support for the elderly. Throughout Chinese history (up to the early third of the 20th century), Chinese parents had a long tradition of parental control rights in children (Cheung, 1972 ).
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In a traditional Chinese family, parents have authority over children even after they grow up, and they arrange children's marriages with some help from professional matchmakers. Thus, love marriage was an exception rather than the norm. Dramatic changes have occurred in the past century. Now in both urban and rural China, love marriage has become the norm.
However, tradition still plays a powerful role, especially in rural China. Furthermore, only in the last ten years or so, rural households began to gain access to state-provided pension and health insurance. Adult children thus had been their primary source of old age support.
The traditional norms, as well as the slow catch up of public support, help to explain why some parents still interfere heavily in the life of their adult children, and why lial piety (i.e., being respectful and obedient to parents) is still the key value in the Chinese family systems.
We incorporate both agency costs and search costs into a theoretical framework, and derive several testable implications. First, we predict that the love in a marriage should be lower for parents-involved matches than for self-matches. This is because parents value more than their son the monetary and household production components of his marriage, and they have a higher marginal cost in assessing love between their son and a potential daughter-in-law. Due to the agency cost, the overall marriage gain to the son, measured by love, income and household production but excluding search cost, would be lower under 1 This paragraph draws from Cheung (1972) , which provides an intuitive, comprehensive, and entertaining explanations of many traditional family institutions such as parental ownership of children, blind marriage, daughter-in-law raised from childhood, dowery, and so on. parents-involved matches than self matches. However, the sharable part of the marriage outcome could be lower or higher under parental matchmaking. It would be higher because parents put more emphasis on sharable market and household production than on love, and therefore the wife that is picked by parents tends to have a higher ability to contribute to the sharable productions. It could be lower when parents over-emphasize goods produced within the household and the preservation of old social structure at the expense of market productivity. In this case, the couple's income can be lower in parents-involved matches, but key inputs (or traits) for household production such as the number of children, willingness to provide old age support, and the submissiveness of the wife would increase.
Following BMS (2015), we further discuss how the need of old age support shapes the eect of parental matchmaking on marriage outcomes. For nancially constrained parents who have to rely on their children for old age support, it is dicult to commit adult children to providing old age support. One way to obtain the commitment is parental investment in shaping children's preferences (when they are young) so that they are more altruistic toward parents; 2 as a result, parents get more old age support, which in turn motivates parents to invest optimally on children's human capital. Though BMS (2015) deal only with the preference of the son (in our context), their basic idea can be readily applied to the situation of parent matchmaking, which can be another instrument to meddle with children's (or children-in-law's) preferences. Although it is largely impossible to change the preference of a daughter-in-law after marriage, parents can help to select the right kind of daughter-in-law:
she had better be submissive to family authority, be cooperative in delivering old age support, and be diligent in doing household chores. Under the assumption that more children imply more old age support, parents may also use matchmaking to ensure that their son has more children to provide him old age support in the future. Because urban areas rely less on children for old age support (and enforce the one-child-policy more vigorously), the demand for the number of children under parental matchmaking would be lower in urban regions than in rural regions. Moreover, since urban areas present more market opportunities, urban parents may emphasize more on sharable monetary income than rural parents.
We take these predictions to a sample of about 3400 rural couples and 3800 urban couples in 1991 in seven Chinese provinces. Here 48% of rural couples and 14.5% of urban couples were married by parent-involved matchmaking; the rest by either self search or friend introduction (both of which are referred to as self match). We examine a number of marriage outcomes, including the degree of domestic harmony to capture the emotional output of marriage, the joint income of husband and wife to capture the couple's economic well-being, 2 See Heckman (2008) for evidence on how parent inuence on children is more prominent when children are young.
and measures of inputs to sharable household goods such as the number of children, the son's belief in old age support, and the submissiveness of the daughter-in-law.
Comparison across parental and self matching largely supports our theoretical predictions. In both rural and urban areas, parent-involved matches yield a lower marital harmony; in contrast, parent-matched marriages yield higher couple income in urban areas, but lower income in rural areas, all after we control for individual-level observable and unobservable attributes that may lead to selection in parental matchmaking. In rural areas, parent-matched marriages are associated with more children. Moreover, wives in parent-matched marriages tend to hold more traditional views that emphasize women's secondary status within a family. The dierent results in rural and urban areas can be explained by relative abundance of labor market opportunities and weaker traditional beliefs in urban relative to rural areas.
Our results are consistent with Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015): parents can meddle with children's (or children-in-law's) preferences to ensure old age support. We further provide evidence that parental matchmaking is an important vehicle to achieve this goal.
In addition to oering evidence in support of BMS (2015), this paper contributes to the marriage literature by highlighting the economic tradeo in parental matchmaking. Unlike the classical focus on the eects of sex ratio (Angrist 2002) , divorce law (Chiappori 2002 ), or educational composition on marriage outcomes, we show that the institutional details of how the match is accomplished in the rst place have important implications on marriage outcomes.
3 In a related paper, Edlund and Lagerlof (2006) show that the shift from parental to individual consent in marriage allows the young couple instead of their parents to receive the bride price and thus facilitates economic growth. We dier in that our focus is not on who controls resources in a marriage, but on the economic tradeo of parental matchmaking for both parents and children. The tradeo between love and money has been explored by Fernandez et al. (2005) but from the perspective of marriage sorting on skills and its relationship with income inequality; they do not discuss matchmaking methods.
Our
paper is also related to Cheung (1972) , who argues that many traditional Chinese family practices, 5 including marriage patterns, are shaped by parental considerations to maximize family wealth. That paper does not focus on the eect of matchmaking methods; neither does it oer empirical evidence.
In a short paper, Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) use the same data source to examine the 4 See also Blood (1967) for descriptive analysis of love and arranged marriages.
5 China-specic papers and books on marriage include Chao (1983) , Xu and Whyte (1990) , Cohen (1992) has explored the role that matchmaking methods play in facilitating old age support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical insights, Section 3 summarizes the data, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. A brief conclusion is oered in Section 5.
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Identication
In this section, we rst present an agency model of parent matchmaking and then interpret it in the context of old age support in rural and urban China. The last subsection discusses empirical implications and how we plan to test them with data.
Agency model of parental matching
Consider the marital decision of a young man, who has nished schooling and started working to earn a living. The search process for a potential wife can either be conducted directly by his parents or by himself. The process that yields a higher net expected utility to him will be implemented. This set up is meant to capture the current practice in China, where marriage in general cannot be forced upon by parents, and males are usually the one who Becker's comment on an early draft was no doubt the best luck he could encounter. (For this, we thank Dali Yang for inviting us to the conference.) Indeed, Becker oered so many constructive comments that he completely changed our perspecitve on the issue. His main suggestions were that we should also consider parental matchmaking from the parents' point of view, that parents might use this method to ensure old age support, that preference might be important (which was a key point in his presentation), and that parental matchmaking may not be inecient given specic institutional and social arrangements.
initiates and proposes marriage. 7 
Basic Set up
An individual's benet from marriage can be categorized into two dimensions: one is the economic gain from joint household production, and the other is emotional support from the spouse. The total benet is aected not only by the characteristics of husband and wife, but also by their matching quality.
Let h m ≥ 0 denote the young man's human capital level, which aects his earning and his intra-household productivity. The human capital may capture, for example, his character, innate ability, years of schooling, communication skills, and so on. Similarly, let h f ≥ 0 denote his potential wife's human capital level. Combined, h m and h f determine the total marriage gains f (h f , h m ), which reects both the couple's household production output and joint income earned from markets. We assume f (0, 0) > 0, f i > 0, f ij > 0, and f ii ≤ 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Another key element in marriage is match quality, denoted by α which is idiosyncratic to the couple and not readily observed by others; it can be interpreted as love or attraction between two persons, which is often unpredictable based on commonly observed characteristics. This implies that α can be treated as uncorrelated with h f . Given our assumption that marriage is always implemented with mutual consent by the young couple, the emotional output of marriage can be normalized as positive and α > 0 is assumed.
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For a young man with h m , the overall gain from marrying a wife with h f and α is (β +α)f (h f , h m ), where β > 0. One may think of the parameter β as capturing the husband's share of material gain from the marriage, while α captures the degree of emotional benet.
The parents' gain from their son being married to a wife with characteristics (α, h f ) also contains two parts: one is the public good component f (h f , h m ) that generates a utility of γ · f (h f , h m ), and the other is the altruistic component δ(β + α)f (h f , h m ) because they care about the welfare of their son, where γ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Since the love α between the husband and wife is by denition consumed privately by the couple themselves, it does not aect the parents' welfare directly. The wife's characteristics that may aect the whole family, such as pleasant personality and beauty, are already indicated by the wife's human capital h f , which as mentioned earlier is broadly dened and not restricted to formal schooling. 7 It is useful to note that a similar model can be used to study the search process of a young woman, and it can also be readily extended to the case where parents arrange the marriage without consent of children.
8 This assumption is for simplicity only, as the same results can be derived for the case with α ≤ 0. 
Searching Costs
Marital search is costly. If searching himself, the son has to bear the search cost, which is η m c(α, h f , h m ) > 0, where η m , c 1 , c 2 > 0 and c 3 , c 31 , c 32 < 0. This means that it is more costly for a man with a given h m to nd and persuade a woman with better quality (with higher α or h f ) to become his wife, and the search cost for a wife of a given quality is lower if the man's h m is higher. The parameter η m denotes the eect of some common elements on the search cost by oneself for all individuals in a marriage market and is thus not dependent on idiosyncratic conditions of searching.
If the marriage is through parent search, parents will bear the search cost, which presumably depends on how intelligent they are in assessing α and how well they are connected with relevant social networks that have access to potential candidates. The parents' degree of competence in this matter is denoted by h p ≥ 0. The parental search cost is η p s(α, h f , h p ) > 0, where η p , s 1 , s 2 > 0 and s 3 , s 31 , s 32 < 0. Similar to η m , the parameter η p denotes some common factor that aects the cost of searching by all parents. To capture the idea that the match quality α is couple idiosyncratic, we assume that, in order to achieve the same level of α, the parents' search cost cannot be too low compared with the direct search by their son, i.e., η p s 1 ≥ δη m c 1 for any given h m , h f , and h p .
The Son's Optimal Choice of Search Methods
The son decides whether to search for his marriage partner himself or to delegate the search to his parents. If he searches himself, his objective function is
The corresponding optimal choices of his potential wife's characteristics that result from searching by himself are denoted by α * and h * f , which are characterized by the following rst order conditions
If his parents manage the search, their objective function is tions that characterize α * * and h * * f are
It is not dicult to see that in general the optimal wives are dierent between these two search processes.
Then the son's choice problem is
where the second term is the son's net utility when his parents do the search for him.
Searching by himself will prevail if U * ≥ U * * , while his parents will be delegated to do the search if the opposite U * < U * * is true.
10 The main implications of the optimal solution to this problem are summarized by the following propositions (see Appendix A for proof ):
P roposition1: Eects of Parental Matchmaking: The emotional output and the overall marriage gain to the son are lower under parental involvement, i.e., α
But it is possible that the couple's joint household production is higher, i.
may be true. Propositions 1-3 also suggest that parental involvement in marital search is endogenous to individual attributes; it is more likely to happen when the son's human capital level h m is lower or the searching cost η m is higher, or when his parents benet more from the household public good (when γ is higher) and have lower searching costs (when h p is higher and η p is lower). In other words, in a xed marriage market, there are two sources of self-selection in the choice of marital search methods: one is from the son and the other is from the parents; a young man with a lower human capital, or with parents that are more capable or more motivated is more likely to rely on parental search. with human capital h m and parents' eectiveness h p , for example, will optimally choose to rely on his parents to search for a potential wife because his human capital is lower than the threshold level h # m corresponding to his parents' eectivenessh p . This choice can also be understood from the alternative perspective: given his human capital level h m , his parents are competent enough (since h p is higher than the corresponding threshold level h # p ) to nd a good wife for him so that he does not bother to search by himself.
Parental Perspective in light of Old Age Support
The above agency model is based on the child's perspective, that is, it is his decision to choose self search or parent search. In this subsection, we interpret the model from the parent's perspective, especially in light of their need for old age support.
Since old age support entails nancial support and home services from the married couple, parents, if nancially constrained, have extra demand for the daughter-in-law's ability in producing labor income and/or home services. This implies that the attributes that can contribute to these production abilities, for example schooling for labor income and submissiveness for home services, will be favored under parental matchmaking.
The rural-urban dierences in the provision of old age support have implications on what types of marriages and wife traits the parents would prefer. In urban areas, parents tend to have better access to old age support through state-provided pension and health insurance if they have worked at a government unit, a state-owned enterprise, or a state-funded non-prot organization. This signicantly reduces the nancial risks faced by old people and their adult children. In sharp contrast, until the 2000s almost all rural residents had no access to state-provided pension or health insurance, unless they held an urban hukou as a teacher or were government ocials (which were rare). In our model, a greater reliance on adult children for old age support can be interpreted as rural parents putting more weight on the couple's sharable production relative to the son's welfare (i.e. higher γ). This implies greater agency cost under parental matching, as the wife candidates ltered by parents will demonstrate more attributes preferable by the parents for their old age support (∂h * * f /∂γ > 0 mathematically).
Strong implications on what types of wife the son would want are also provided by BMS (2015), which modies the implications of our model signicantly. So far we assume that the son cares only about his own welfare while parents are altruistic, following the standard assumption in Becker's Rotten Kids Theorem (Becker 1981) . BMS (2015) argue that parents have incentives to manipulate the son's preference when he was young so that he is more altruistic towards the parents' old age support when he grows up. This is consistent with the traditional value of Chinese families, which emphasizes that it is the son's duty to continue the surname by having children and to take care of parents when they are old. If the son's altruism is incorporated in our model, the son's preference will be more aligned with the parent's preference (e.g. allow β to increase with γ). Not only does this reduce the agency cost of parental matchmaking (thus leading to more parental matchmaking), but it also encourages the son to choose a wife closer to the parents' preferences even if he decides to search by himself. BMS (2015) thus recongure the forces underlying the costs and benets of parent matchmaking so that the benets now loom larger, and parents' demand for certain traitssay, submissiveness of the daughter-in-lawis more likely to win out in the end. It also renders the son to be more willing to delegate the search to parents.
Another key dierence between rural and urban residents is that rural couples have more freedom in choosing how many children to have, and this freedom aects the impact of parent matchmaking on the number of children for the couple. Though both rural and urban China adopted one-child policy since early 1980s, enforcement is looser in rural areas. One reason is that rural labor is an important input for agricultural production, and without access to pension and health insurance, having a greater number of children is an important way 11 We thus expect a smaller or no eect of parent matchmaking on the number of children, but a more pronounced eect on daughter-in-law traits that are more conducive for labor market income and/or in-home provision of old age support.
Empirical Issues
To summarize, we argue that some conict of interest may arise between parents and son because parents rely on their married son for old age support and other sharable production of the couple, but love is more or less private consumption within the couple.
12 This conict of interest, combined with search cost in the marriage market, leads to an interesting relationship between parental matchmaking, husband's belief about old age support, wife characteristics, and marriage outcomes such as love and joint couple income. The main insight is that parents involved in matchmaking prefer a wife that can provide more sharable production, even if such preferences lead to less love within the couple.
However, this prediction is subject to the constraint of the son's endogenous choice of the matchmaking method. In particular, the choice of search method may not only be aected by random elements, but also by the son's and his parents' characteristics as reected by the adverse and positive selection problems in the above propositions.
If we can perfectly control parents' characteristics (h p , γ), then the average marital quality tend to enjoy the companion and even household production from grandchildren (e.g., fetching water where there is no indoor water), and this would result in a positive relationship between parent matchmaking and the number of children for the couple. The overall eect of parent matchmaking on the number of children may therefore be ambiguous. However, children tends to be less costly to raise in rural areas due to intergenerational cohabitation, the competition eect should be weaker in rural areas, again pushing for a more positive and pronounced relationship between parent matchmaking and the number of children.
12 That love is a private good is nicely illustrated by an episode of Seinfeld. Jerry and Elaine, once lovers and then friends for a long time, became lovers again. Witnessing Jerry and Elaine's intimate behavior, Kramer, Jerry's old friend and neighbor, blurted out, I like you two so much more when you were friends! of husbands with parental involvement must be lower than others even when their wives are of exactly the same quality because the husbands in the former group have lower human capital (h m < h # m ); this is the adverse selection eect of sons. In contrast, when the husband's characteristics are fully controlled, those with parental involvement must have had more competent parents (h p > h # p ) with respect to searching, which implies that their wife's overall quality, especially their human capital level h * * f , may be higher than others', and
hence their marital quality may also be higher; this is the positive selection eect of parents.
Thus, without properly accounting for these two sources of the endogeneity problem, the OLS estimated coecient of parental matchmaking can be either higher or lower than the true eect, depending on which selection is dominant.
Our approach to address this challenge is to use an instrumental variable that aects the choice of search method but not wife characteristics and marital outcomes directly. above propositions but may pick up unobserved local culture and tradition independent of average income or schooling in local city/township.
Consider two identical marriage markets
In particular, we estimate the following specication:
where Y i denotes marital outcomes, wife characteristics, and husband i's belief in old age support; α rural is a dummy for rural areas; Z i denotes husband's observable characteristics such as age, religion, schooling, and party membership (we also include his parents' schooling); Z township denotes average income and schooling at district/township level; and P arentM atched i is a dummy indicating whether i's parents were involved in the search for his wife.
We shall estimate this equation with both OLS and 2SLS. While β with any parent at all), and therefore the paternal parents have clearer incentives to value a marriage candidate's ability in economic and home production. Our sample thus consists of husbands. Wife characteristics will be examined as dependent variables, as they are the result of the choice of the husband (and his parents if they were involved in the search process).
Old Age Support From Adult Children
A key assumption in our theoretical framework section is that children, especially those in rural areas, are key providers of old age support, and parents may prefer certain types of daughter-in-laws to deliver them old age support. We now provide some suggestive evidence from SSCCW to validate our assumption.
Based on a few questions on old age support, a signicant share of residents, especially the rural ones, rely more on their children for old age support. husband's answer), and it is quite rare to live with the wife's parents in both rural and urban areas (5% rural, 6% urban, according to husband's answer). At the time of the survey, fewer rural couples were still living with the husband's parents (29% rural and 39.9% urban), but this is partly because more rural parents have passed away, and rural parents have more children to live with so that the probability of living with a particular child would be lower.
To recap, the survey data conrm that rural parents rely more on their children for old age support, and old age support is typically provided by son and daughter-in-law. Between the couple, the wife is more likely to provide home services to the elderly if such need arises. All these suggest that parents have strong incentives to participate in the choice of daughter-in-law, especially in the rural areas.
Key Variables
The question on matchmaking methods asked how an individual met his or her spouse initially. There are four original categories in the data: introduced by parents or relatives, by friends, by themselves, and by other means. We dene a dummy of P arentM atch equal to one if the husband has been matched by the introduction of parents or relatives and 0 if otherwise. We cannot distinguish parents from relatives partly because the distinction is not available in the data, partly because relatives are an integrated part of the parents' social networks to facilitate the search process. A perhaps more debatable decision is that we do not dierentiate couples initially introduced by friends from those who met by themselves. The reason is that these two groups are similar: in both cases, it is the young people themselves, not their parents, that conducted the search process and bore the search cost. And indeed, empirically these two groups are very similar.
The survey also asked whether the marriage decision was made by self or parents. Subjects were asked to choose from self decision, parental consent, self decision, parental disapproval, self decision, parental consent on both sides, self decision, parental disapproval on both sides, parental decision, self indierent, parental decision, self consent and parental decision, self consent by force. Answer to this question diers greatly by whether P arentM atch is equal to one. For the sample of husbands, 33.8% of them had parental matchmaking. Among those parent matched marriages, 26.6% were parental decision rather than self decision. In comparison, only 6.9% of self matched marriages were parental decision.
Rural parents seem to play a more important role in their children's marriage life than urban parents. This is well reected in our data: 48% of our rural couples were married via parental matchmaking, while this percentage is only 14.5% for urban couples. Moreover, 30 .5% of parent-matched husbands had his marriage decided by his parents in rural areas, as compared to 13.8% in urban areas.
From a husband's perspective, marriage outcomes are represented by love, joint income, non-marketable household production, and wife traits. Given the diculty to quantify love, reported so) so we do not distinguish it from unilateral compromise. The implication is that "no conicts" is the best outcome, while "mutual compromise" comes next in the ranking, which is arguably less costly or more eective than unilateral compromise and third-party mediation. Mutual compromise is better than unilateral compromise also because constant reliance on unilateral compromise eventually leads to resentment and the loss of love. In our view, this harmony index captures the essential meaning of a couple's matching quality:
couples with better matching quality are less likely to have conicts and more capable of solving conicts in an eective way. Though imperfect, the above-mentioned harmony index is a more appropriate measure of the emotional output of marriage in our context than others used in the literature. In modern western societies, for example, whether a marriage ends up in divorce is a natural measure of marital quality. The extremely low divorce rate in China by 1991, however, renders this measure less useful.
Joint couple income is measured by the summation of the annual incomes of the husband and of the wife. This is a key measure for the market component of marriage gains. It is perhaps useful to keep in mind that maximized couple income could be achieved either by both work for market incomes or by specialization, that is, one works for the market while the other specializes in household production.
We also measure wife traits to study whether parent matchmakers systematically prefer wives of certain traits. As we have emphasized so far, parents have strong incentives to obtain old age support from children, and daughter-in-laws are especially instrumental in delivering home services for old age support. Indeed, old age support can be obtained in two ways:
money transfer from children, or direct provision of home services to the elderly.
14 Because old age support in the household is usually provided by the wife, its eective delivery requires values and beliefs conformative to a traditional society. Indeed, for thousands of years in Chinese history, a top value for children is lial piety (Cheung, 1972) , which emphasizes being obedient and submissive to parents. Indeed, the second Chinese character for lial piety, xiao shun, means literally being submissive and following orders of parents. This is especially important for picking a wife for the son: the son was already trained to be obedient to parents within the household for all the years, but the wife will join the family as an adult and it is almost impossible to train her to be submissive after marriage. Thus, matchmaking parents would prefer to pick a young woman that have already submitted to those submissive values (Cheung, 1972) . Such values would be conducive to the happiness of the parents and to the provision of old age support.
To measure the submissiveness of the wife, we rely on three specic measures and one aggregate measure. First, Wife Career Unimportant is a dummy variable indicating an answer in agreement to the following statement: a wife's career achievement should not exceed that of her husband. This indicates conformity to the traditional value of superiority of man over woman, and makes husbands' wishes easier to carry through in the family. interpret it mainly as a belief: the wording is not about whether the husband in our survey had received an ex-ante oer of inheritance conditional on providing old age support. Such contracts are uncommon and non-enforcible in China. Rather, the question is among a long list of belief questions, and it is worded as whether the surveyed husband would reward the care-giving children more household assets for providing old age support when they are old.
When the husband believes that providers of old age support deserve more household assets, two scenarios are likely: either the responding husband inherently believes in the moral value of adult children providing old age support, or his parents (or the local community) have instilled this value in him. Either way, those believing in Reward for Providing Old Age Support tend to have a stronger belief in the duty of adult children in providing old age support to their parents.
Sample and Summary Statistics
As detailed in Section 2, parental matchmaking is subject to individual-level selection, and we will use local norm of parental matchmaking as an instrument for individual-level choice of matchmaking means. As a result, we need a big enough sample to compute the norm in every province-urban-age cell where age refers to the same age as or up to three years older than the survey respondent. We thus delete any province-urban-age cells that contain fewer than 35 observations. The number of 35 is somewhat arbitrary, but it ensures a reasonable number of observations to compute the mean (excluding oneself ), while at the same time not losing too many observations of the sample. This restriction leads to a sample with males no older than early 50s at the time of survey (1990). Dropping old males has an added benet: the individuals that remain in our sample do need to consider old age support for their parents, which suits the purpose of this paper well. In total, we have 6,334
husbands in the analysis sample, 57.6% of which lived in rural areas at the time of survey. Parent-matched couples are dierent from self-matched couples as well. Table 2 Using the husband sample, Table 3 shows a linear-probability estimation on the determinants of parental matchmaking. 15 In column (1) we do not, and in column (2), we do, control for religion and ethnicity dummies. Rural male was much more likely to be parent-matched (by 15 to 18 percentage points). The older the husband was at the time of the survey, the more likely that his marriage was via parental matchmaking. This suggests that parental matchmaking was strongly related to the era that he lives. Interestingly, relative to atheists, Muslin male and Buddhist male tend to rely more on parental matchmaking. Some ethnic groups such as Koreans and Manchurians tend to use parental matchmaking to a greater extent. Consistent with our summary statistics, the reliance on parental matchmaking is signicantly lower when the district or township that he lives in is richer, and when the local average schooling is higher.
Empirical Results

Eect on Love and Joint Income
We rst examine how parental matchmaking relates to marital harmony and joint couple income. To isolate the eects of parental matchmaking, we include a long list of control variables: (1) the husband's own age (in log) and schooling;
16 ( 17 Since rural and urban regions dier greatly in marriage markets historically and culturally rural and urban residents rarely mixed up in marriage and their residents also dier greatly in social security, in all regressions we allow parental matchmaking to have distinct eects in rural areas. A rural dummy is also included as a control variable.
Our key right hand side variable is parental matchmaking. As detailed in Section 2, a more competent son will conduct the mate search himself, and conditional on child attributes, more competent parents are more likely to search for their sons. This is why we control for 15 Similar results are found when relying on probit.
16 We got very similar results when including age and age squared instead.
17 The average income and schooling are computed based on sample information. We exclude the self in computing the local average to avoid articial correlation of these variables and the outcomes of an individual.
We have also tried including other variables such as the ownership dummies of the husband's rst job.
Their inclusion did not aect any of our key results.
both child and parent characteristics in the regression. Nevertheless, selection based on unobservable individual characertisitcs is still likely.
To deal with such individual-level selections, we use local norm of parental matchmaking as the instrumental variable for one's own matchmaking choice. The social norm of parental matchmaking is constructed as the share of males getting married via parental matchmaking in the same province-urban cell with the same age or being older by up to three years. Our baseline results are contained in Table 4 . In the rst 3 columns, we report the results for Harmony. Column (1) reports the OLS result with a base set of controls; column (2) adds religion and ethnic dummies; column (3) is the 2SLS result corresponding to column (2) . The next three columns repeat the same structure with the dependent variable being the logarithm of joint couple income. All standard errors are White-corrected and clustered at the district / township level since we have local income and schooling controls at this level. The contrasting eects on joint income in urban and rural areas likely reect dierent patterns of old age support and dierent institutional constraints. First, in urban areas, market opportunities are more abundant (both for labor and for services such as meals, laundry and care-giving), yet the enforcement of the one-child policy is more stringent, both factors contributing to urban couples relying more on monetary income (relative to household production) to deliver old age support. As a consequence, parents in their self interest to ensure old age support also have strong interest to ensure that the family structure would yield relatively high income. Thus, the eect of parental matchmaking on joint couple income tend to be positive in urban areas. In contrast, in rural areas, there are much fewer opportunities to make money and buy services; but there are more opportunities to evade the one-child policy. Thus parents have to rely more on household production to ensure the delivery of old age support. We thus witness a substitution of market production by household production in rural areas, which explains why the eect of parental matchmaking on (market) couple income is negative in rural areas. These conjectures also imply that urban and rural parents might pick wives of dierent skills and traits.
4.2
Eects on Wife's Schooling, Income and Submissiveness
As rural couples rely more on household production for the delivery of old age support than urban couples, and wives tend to play the role of caregivers in traditional Chinese families, we expect that rural parents, upon the opportunity to act as matchmaker for their sons, would have strong incentives to pick potential wives who would specialize in household production.
For smooth delivery of household production, the rural parents would pick daughter-in-laws that are submissive. While rural parents likely would prefer daughter-in-laws that are both submissive and well-educated, such a combination is rare or infeasible. Rural parents therefore have to settle for submissiveness at the expense of lower education. We thus expect matchmaking rural parents end up picking daughter-in-laws with lower educational levels but higher submissiveness. In contrast, urban reliance on market income (along with some household care) and the ample payo for skills in urban areas (including in household productions) imply that urban matchmaking parents are less willing to get more submissiveness at the expense of education. These parents therefore do not necessarily pick higher or lower levels of schooling of the wife for the son than the son would have picked by himself.
This conjecture is conrmed by the left panel of Table 5 . According to the 2SLS estimate, the eect of Parent Matched is insignicant in urban areas, but negative and signicant for rural areas. The rural eect is quite large: relative to self-matched marriages, one standard deviation increase in parental matchmaking in rural areas feature wives with 1.04 standard deviation less schooling.
Note that higher wife schooling does not necessarily translate into higher earnings from the wife. In fact, as shown in the right panel of Table 5 , parent-matched marriages are associated with signicantly lower wife earnings in both urban and rural areas, before and after we control for unobserved individual-level selection by instrumental variable. One explanation is that wives in parents-matched marriages tend to specialize more in household production. This is consistent with parents' interest in obtaining more household care.
To check whether parental matchmaking favors a submissive wife, which we presume to be a key condition for delivering old age support in traditional societies, Table 6 The rest of Table 8 Again, this is consistent with endogenous preference (Becker, 1996) : in urban areas where market opportunities are greater for women, less career discouragement is imposed on women;
in rural areas where market opportunities are less for women but old age support is primarily dependent on within-household services, parents discourage women's market value more.
Turning to No Good Male Friend, both rural and urban wives under parent-matched marriages believe more than self-matched wives in that a married woman should not have good male friends, as compared to the self-matched wives. This attitude/preference is consistent with more marriage stability and more attention to household production. After all, outside friendship with the opposite sex could lead to more time spent outside the household or emotional distraction, both of which may destabilize marriage and invalidate the investments that parents have already made in nding the suitable mates for their sons.
Finally, the last panel of Table 6 shows that wives under parent-matched marriages tend to believe that wives should not reject sex requests by their husbands. Again, this is consistent with the notion that parents-matched wives are more submissive and respect more the traditional patriarchal value. Overall, Table 6 renders a strong support to the argument that relative to wives under self-matched marriages, those under parent-matched marriages tend to be more submissive and more suitable in providing old age support within the household.
4.3
Husband's Belief in Old Age Support and the Number of Children Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015) suggest that parents in need of old age support have incentives to induce more altruistic preference from their sons, in order to ensure smooth and committed delivery of old age support. To check this argument, we examine how husband belief in old age support diers under parent-and self-matched marriages.
In the OLS results of Table 7 , Parent Matched is positively correlated with Reward for Providing Old Age Support (i.e., a belief that old age support should be rewarded), but not statistically signicant. When we use the instrument, the coecient becomes statistically signicant and of similar magnitude in urban and rural areas. According to the 2SLS results, a one-standard-deviation increase in Parent Matched (0.47) is associated with a higher probability of parent-matched husbands to agree to Reward for Providing Old Age Support by 0.8 standard deviation. This piece of evidence is consistent with Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015). Table 8 associates parental matchmaking with the number of children that the surveyed couple has. From old age support point of view, parents do not benet directly from a greater number of grandchildren. However, altruistic parents may view more grandchildren as a warranty for their son's old age support and prefer the couple to have more children. Table 8 reports two panels of results, one on the number of children, and the other on whether the couple has three or more children. Given the imperfect enforcement of one-child policy in rural areas, it is common to have two children so the margin for parents to push is on the third child. In comparison, three or more children is much less likely in urban (6.3%) than in rural areas (23.5%). This dierence is reected in both OLS and 2SLS results. After controlling for individual-level selection by instrumental variable, urban couples are even less likely to have three or more children if they were parent-matched (marginally signicant at 10%), but rural couples are much more likely to have three or more children under parental matchmaking (signicant at 1%). This is consistent with the argument that since rural households have little access to state-provided pension and health insurance, they have to rely heavily on children for old age support.
Conclusion
While many economic studies have examined various aspects of marriages, little attention has been paid to the role that parents play in their children's marriage formation, to how various matchmaking means aect the selection of spouse and marriage outcomes, and to how institutional dierences such as the provision of old age support aect the eect of matchmaking means. In this paper, we use unique data on Chinese households to examine what types of people use parental matchmaking (versus relying on self matches), and how parental matchmaking aects marriage harmony, joint income, and husband and wife traits that are conducive to the delivery of old age support.
In a simple theoretical framework, we show that parental matchmaking may distort the son's optimal spouse selection because parents tend to emphasize a potential wife's ability and temperament for providing sharable household goods, and downplay the love or emotional chemistry within the couple. Put dierently, relative to the son, parents are more willing to substitute love between the couple for sharable household production. We further interpret this model in light of parental need for old age support, following BMS (2015).
We nd supporting evidence for the model: parental involvement is negatively associated with marital harmony; in comparison, it is associated with more submissive wives, who play a key role in delivering home services for elderly parents. We also nd suggestive evidence that urban and rural areas use dierent supporting mechanisms for old age support. In urban areas, with more labor market opportunities and more stringent enforcement of the one-child policy, parents rely more on the monetary income channel for ensuring old age support, and as a result, parental matchmaking is associated with higher joint couple income. In contrast, in rural areas, labor market opportunities are fewer and it is easier to evade the one-child policies. As a result, parents rely more on household production for ensuring old age support, and rural wives are found to have lower schooling but be more submissive under parental matchmaking than under self match. Joint income is also lower for parent matched couples than for self-matched couples in rural areas. These rural-urban contrasts in behavior, along with the nding that sons and daughters-in-law tend to have traits and beliefs that are conducive for the delivery of old age support, render support to BMS (2015), who argue that parents systematically manipulate preferences for ensuring old age support. The result is also consistent with an insight from Cheung (1972) : institutions are often evolved to serve the prevalent needs of economic players. Here, parental matchmaking is conducive to the delivery of old age support: when capital market is inecient and old age support is privately provided, parental matchmaking is employed to ensure that parents can commit their adult son and daughter-in-law to oer old age support.
Overall, parental matchmaking introduces an interesting tradeo. On the one hand, it entails agency costs in terms of less love within the couple. On the other hand, it helps to ensure old age support for the matchmaking parents, and a more harmonious intergenerational relationship. After our sample period, China has evolved towards more state-provided pension and health insurance for rural households and the urban poor. As more and more old age support is provided outside household, traditional values such as lial piety and submissiveness of children may become less important for parents and increasingly unproductive for the society as a whole (e.g, it may discourage risk-taking, proactive and innovative behaviors among the young). If our theory is right, we expect parental matchmaking to play dierent roles in this transition. After all, with more old age support from the society, parents have less need to manipulate children's preferences or select submissive but less capable (in market production) daughters-in-law. This topic warrants future research. Kleibergen-Paap Walk rk F stat 16.9 14.2 Note. *, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. Note. *, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap Walk rk F stat 18.2 Note. *, **, and ***: statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. White-corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. (1) of 
